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a Utah Corporation, 
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WAYNE GARFF, individually, 
NORTHE!l'J DEVELOPMENT COMP/WY, and 
THREE FOUNTAINS OF NORTH OGDEN, INC., 
Third-party Defendants, Cross-Defendants, 
and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 19278 
Appellants filed a Motion under Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to set aside a Judgment which was entered against them 
in their absence and after their then counsel had infonned them that the 
matter had been fully settled by all parties dismissing all claims, 
counterclaims and cross-claims. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court denied Appellants' MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
and Appellants' MOTION FOR REHEARING ON TI-l!RD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the decision of the District Court 
which denied Appellants' MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT and Appellant's 
MOTION FOR REHEARING ON TI-IIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The adversaries in this matter are Maurice Richards, his present 
wife who is the fonner Myrtle (Susie) Bisel, (R. 353) and the legal firm 
of which he is a partner, Richards, Caine & Richards, as Respondents. 
The Appellants, Wayne Garff and Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc., 
are former clients of Maurice Richards and his law firm. ( R. 70, Defen-
dant's Exhibit 1, 2 and 10) Named by Maurice Richards as Third-party 
Defendants and CrossDefendants are two other Companies, Northern Develop-
ment Company and Three Fountains of North Ogden, Inc., that were, during 
the time in question, clients of Maurice Richards and his law firm. (R. 
70, Defendant's Exhibit 2 and 10) 
The Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint in this case (R. 1-13) was filed 
on October 28, 1977 ( R. 1), after having been served on Defendant Maurice 
Richards on October 21, 1977 (R. 15). A Default Certificate was entered 
against Defendant Maurice Richards on Monday, November 21, 1977 (R. 17), 
and a hearing was set for a Default Judgment to be taken the same day 
(R. 16, 300-308), as no responsive pleading had been filed. However, John 
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Caine, an associate of Defendant Maurice Richards, happened to be in 
Court at the time set for the Default hearing (R. 301) and upon his repre-
sentations that he would see that responsive pleadings were filed by Wed-
nesday, November 23, 1977 (R. 16, 302, 307) the Default Judgment was not 
granted (R. 307-308). Responsive pleadings were not filed until Tuesday, 
November 29, 1977 ( R.18-37). 
The first trial for this case was set for October 26, 1978. This was 
evidently a non-jury trial setting which was striken by the Court because 
a Jury Demand was filed by Appellants' then counsel on October 12, 1978. 
(R. 52, 113) 
The second trial setting for January 22, 1979 ( R. 278), and the 
third trial setting for April 26, 1979 (R. 278) were continued because of 
medical problems allegedly suffered by Respondent Maurice Richards (R. 58-
59). 
A fourth trial setting for September 17, 1979, was continued due to 
three criminal cases and two civil cases pending trial ahead of this case 
with only two judges being available for trial. (R. 62) 
A fifth trial setting for January 7 1980, (R. 114 and 122) (R. 278 
indicates January 17, 1979, but at least the year must be in error in 
that the prior trial setting was September 17, 1979) was continued due to 
the continuing medical problems of Respondent Maurice Richards (R. 114) 
or serious i 11 ness of Stan Adams ( R. 122). 
A sixth trial setting for April 10, 1980, was continued because 
"Gary Walker was not noticed for this trial, and the Court ruled that the 
case cannot proceed". ( R. 50) Gary Walker was the President of Northern 
Development Company (R. 70, Defendant's Exhibit 4) and Three Fountains of 
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North Ogden, Inc. (R. 70, Defendant's Exhibit 7, ARTICLE VIII). He too 
had personally been a client of Maurice Richards. (R. 321, lines 24 and 
25, and 322, lines 1-4) Respondent's Counsel also alleged that an addi-
tional objection to the trial proceeding on the sixth setting was that 
the Judge had played handball with Appellant Wayne Garff. (R. 123) 
On July 22, 1980, Appellant sent a letter to his then attorney 
requesting him to settle the case, if Respondents would agree, by both 
parties dismissing their causes of action. (R. 108) This offer was 
conveyed to Respondent's attorney by a letter dated July 25, 1980. (R. 
109) 
Shortly after the above offer of settlement was made, the seventh 
tri a 1 setting for August 11, 1980, was continued i ndefi ni te 1 y at the 
request of counsel for Respondents on the ground that Respondent Maurice 
Richards would be outside of the United States. (R. 65-66) 
On February 10, 1982, (R. 278) nearly two years after the last con-
ti nuance, notice of an eighth trial setting, for June 7, 1982, was sent 
to Appellants' then Counsel. On February 16, 1982, Appellants' then 
Counsel wrote to John Caine, one of the partners in the Respondent law 
firm of Richards, Caine & Richards and after noting receipt of the June 
7, 1982 trial setting, asked: 
Should I prepare or should we dismiss. Please advise. 
( R. 110) 
While no written response was received to this letter, according to 
the Affidavit of Appellants' then Counsel, he did have contact four or 
five times, both by telephone and in person, about Appellants' offer to 
dismiss. He was advised that if he did not hear to the contrary, he 
could consider the case would be dismissed. (R. 104) He heard nothing 
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to the contrary until Appellant cal led him on December 4, 1982, to ask 
about a garnishment that had been served on Pat Blair. ( R. 155 and 243) 
Jn the AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN T. CAINE, Mr. Caine denies discussing a 
settlement with Appellants' fonner Counsel or that he received the letter 
(R. 110) Mr. Adams sent to him. (R. 136) In his AFFIDAVIT OF COLNSEL IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLU-
SIOOS OF LAW /IND JUDGMENT Respondent's Counsel neither acknowledges or 
denies receiving the letter (R. 109) Mr. Adams sent to him. He does 
state he received an "oral communication" of such an offer, communicated 
it to his clients who refused same and then so advised Mr. Adams by 
telephone. ( R. 123) 
The eighth trial setting on June 7, 1982, proceeded even though Mr. 
Garff had been informed by his then Counsel that the case had been set-
tled by both parties dropping their claims and that there would be no 
trial. ( R. 105, 152 and 244) 
Jn order to make sure of his understanding, Mr. Garff personally 
asked his then Attorney, Stanley s. Adams, on the very day of the trial, 
June 7, 1982, if he was to go to trial. He was told not to worry,"! am 
sure it is settled and there will be no trial". (R. 152) 
The FINDINGS OF FACT f>ND CONCLUSJOO OF LAW !'>ND JUDGMENT were submitted 
to the Court in August, 1982, and signed on August 19, 1982. (R. 76 and 
139) A copy of this JUDGMENT was not served upon Apellant or his attor-
ney until September 21, 1982. (R. 125-126, 'If 23) The copy mailed to 
Mr. Adams on September 21, 1982, was received by a Sylvia Martinez on 
September 23, 1982. (R. 127 and 139) Sylvia Martinez was a receptionist 
employee of Mr. Adams' landlord at the Valley Bank Towers Building and 
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not of Mr. Adams. She had no authority from Mr. Adams to accept certi-
fied mail for Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams was on vacation from September 20 
until September 27, 1982, and had no knowledge that a Judgment had been 
entered in the matter until Mr. Garff called him about a Garnishment 
that had been served on Mrs. Patricia (Pat) Blair. (R. 78 and 243) 
It was not until December 4, 1982, that Mr. Garff received his first 
hint that something was wrong when he was told by Mrs. Patricia Blair 
that she had received a writ of Garnishment against Wayne Garff Construc-
tion Co. He then cal led Mr. Adams and asked him to investigate. It was 
not until December 13, 1982, that he actually learned that a Judgment had 
been taken against him. (R. 155-156) 
Appellants' MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT (R. 79-80) was mailed Decem-
ber 21, 1982, and received by the Clerk of the Court on December 22, 
1982. It was, therefore, received by the Clerk nine (9) days after Mr. 
Garff actually learned of the Judgment against him and only eighteen 
(18) days after receiving the first information that would even cause 
him to suspect there was a Judgment against him. 
that: 
In the Court's March 24, 1983, MEMORAADUM DEC! SION, the Court noted 
.. Under the facts as stated by plaintiffs affidavit, it could 
possibly be construed there was excusable neglect for not appearing 
at the time the trial was set. The problem with plaintiff's present 
m?tion is that judgment was entered on August 19, 1982, and filed 
with the clerk on August 23, 1982, and the plaintiff and his attorney 
received notice of judgment on September 23, 1982. However, they 
did not file the motion to set aside the judgment until December 22, 
1982, s?me four months after the date of entry of judgment, even 
some thirty days after the writ of garnishment had been is sued 
against the plaintiffs. Even though plaintiff had some cause for 
excu~able neglect to set aside the judgment, and it appears there is 
possible grounds for the same if you rely upon their affidavits. 
They still fail to meet the requirements under Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil procedure with (sic) provides that: 
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"The motion shal 1 be made within a reasonable time .•• and 
not more than three months after the judment, order, pro-
ceeding (sic) was entered or taken". 
The Plaintiff has not filed the motion timely under Rule 60(b) 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and this motion to set aside 
the default judgment will be denied ... (R. 139) 
Based on the Court's MEMOfW.lDUM DEC! SION dated March 24, 1983, 
Counsel for Third-Party Plaintiffs filed their proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, .Al.JD ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT which 
was signed by the Court on April 11, 1983. (R. 146) 
Appellant Wayne Garff first contacted his present Counsel on learn-
ing of the Court's decision on April 14, 1983. Counsel prepared his 
MOTION FOR REHEARING ON THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ( R. 149-150), supporting AFF!DAVI T of Wayne B. Garff ( R. 
151-156), and ORDER STAYING EXECUTION (R. 179-180) on Saturday, April 16, 
1983, in order to meet the 10 day deadline under Rule 59 (b) and (e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 62 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court signed said ORDER STAYWG EXECUTION 
and copies of said ORDER, MOTION, and AFFIDAVIT were served on opposing 
Counsel on Monday, April 18, 1983, by personal delivery to his office. 
( R. 150 and 180) 
Counsel for Respondents served his MOTION IN OP POSITION TO MOTION 
FOR REHEARING ( R. 181-183), AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEAR-
ING ON THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ( R. 
184-194), AFFIDAVIT OF CO~SEL (R.197-198), AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA MOORE 
(R. 199-200), and AFFIDAVIT of JP-N CHASE (R. 195-196), by mail on Friday, 
May 6, 1983. (R. 183) 
The District Court issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION denying Appellants' 
MOTION FOR REHEARING ON THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDG-
MENT on June 6, 1983, and copies were mailed to Counsel on June 7, 1983. 
(R. 223) Respondent's Counsel mailed a copy of the ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR REHEARING AND ORDER SETTING ASIDE STAY OF EXCUTION to Appellants' 
Counsel on June 8, 1983. (R. 281) Appellants' NOTICE OF APPEAL (R. 284-
285) was filed on June 21, 1983. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MUST BE CORRELATED AND 
INTERPRETED IN CONTEXT WITH OTHER RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, PARTI-
CULARLY RULE 2.9 WRITTEN ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND DECREES, OF THE RULES OF 
PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT COURTS AND CIRCUIT COURTS DF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Paragraphs {a) and (b) of Rule 2.9 Written Orders, Judgments, and 
Decrees of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah provides: 
{a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the parties obtaining 
the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time as 
the court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment 
or decree in confonnity with the ruling. 
{b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders 
shall be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of 
objections thereto shall be sumitted to the court and counsel within 
five (5) days after service. (Emphasis added) 
It is absolutely clear in this case, both from Paragraph 23 of the 
February 2, 1983, AFFIDAVIT OF COLNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT {R. 
125-126) and the Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION (R. 139), that both of the 
above cited sections of Rule 2.9 were flagrantly violated and/or ignored 
by Respondent's Counsel, Mr. Gale. The trial in this matter took place 
on June 7, 1982, and the proposed judgment should have been filed with 
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the court by June 22, 1982. Copies of the proposed Findings and Judgment 
should have been served on Mr. Adams before they were presented to the 
Court for signature. However, as can be seen from the signed FINDINGS 
OF FACT /\ND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT dated August 19, 1982 (R. 
76), Mr. Gale did not file this document with the Court until August, 
some two (2) months after the trial. The Court signed the Judgment on 
August 19, 1982, but Mr. Gale waited more than another month, until 
September 21, 1982, after Mr. Garff' s one month to appeal the Judgment 
under Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure had expired, before 
mailing a copy to Mr. Adams. ( R. 125-126) 
The copy arrived on September 23, 1982, at the office building 
where Mr. Adams rents an office while Mr. Adams was on vacation. A 
receptionist for Mr. Adams landlord, without any authority from Mr. 
Adams signed for the copy but never personally brought the copy to Mr. 
Adams attention. Mr. Adams did not learn about the Judgment against Mr. 
Garff until Mr. Garff called him upon learning about the Garnishment on 
December 4, 1982. (R. 155, 156 and 243) Thereafter, on December 22, 
1982, within 18 days of the date Mr. Garff first received information 
that would give him any reason to believe that there was a judgment 
against him, and within three (3) months of the date the copy of the 
judgment was signed for by an unauthorized person (R. 127 and 243, '4) 
Plaintiff filed his MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT. (R. 79-80) 
Under such circumstances, it should be obvious to the Court that had 
Mr. Gale served copies of his proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW /IND JUDGMENT upon Mr. Adams _before he filed them with the Court 
and within fifteen (15) days of the June 7, 1982, trial, then Appellants' 
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MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT would have been made in June rather than in 
December. 
But most important, it should be cl ear to the Court that the re-
quirement of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the 
motion be made within three months after the judgment was entered must 
be correlated and taken in context of section (b) of Rule 2.9, supra, 
which requires that the Findings and Judgment "shall be served on oppos-
ing counsel before being presented to the court for signature". 
The whole notion, basis, foundation and reason for Rule 60(b) is to 
be able to challenge a Judgment, default or otherwise. How can one chal-
lenge a Judgment if one does not know about it! Therefore, notice of the 
Judgment must be the key date from which the three months required by 
Rule 60(b) is calculated, particularly where Counsel for the party who 
is awarded the Judgment fails to serve a copy of the Findings and Judgment 
on opposing Counsel as required by Rule 2.9, supra. 
The failure of Respondent's Counsel to comply with Rule 2.9 cannot 
be excused on the grounds that this was a default Judgment as he himself 
noted in his MOTI(}J IN OPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING that: 
Garff and his present attorney continue to designate the action 
taken as a default judgment, when in fact a judgment was taken after 
a trial on the issues and the merits of this case. (R. 182) 
Unless copies of a judgment are served on opposing counsel, all 
counsel who obtains a judgment under circumstances such as existed in 
this case need do is wait over three months after he has obtained his 
judgment before he attempts to collect the judgment, as was done in this 
case. The party against whom the Judgment was taken will then be denied 
any relief. In other words, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
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dure contemplat~ __ that the party against whom the Judgment is taken has 
notice that Judgment was taken when it requires that a Motion to Set 
Aside_t_~Judgment be brought within three months. When understood in 
this light, the requirement is that the motion be brought within three 
months o_!_~t_i_~and has been met by Appellant in this case even if the 
court does impute the receipt of a copy of the Judgment by a receptionist 
of Mr. Adams' landlord to Mr. Adams and thus on to Mr. Adams' client, 
Mr. Garff. The receptionist signed for the copy on September 23, 1982. 
(R. 127) The Appellants' Motion was filed by mail on December 21, 1982. 
( R. 80) 
POINT 11 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 2.8 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURTS AND CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Section (b) of Rule 2.8 of the RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT 
COURTS AND CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH states: 
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten (10) days after service of the motion, a statement of 
answering points and authorities and counter affidavits. 
In his MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING Counsel for the 
Respondents moved the District Court " ... for an immediate dismissal of 
the Motion for Rehearing ... and for $2 ,500.00 for their legal fees and 
costs incurred through the attempts of Wayne Garff to delay execution of 
the judgment heretofore entered by this Court." (R. 181-182) Thus Respon-
dents and their counsel dramatically demostrated their propensity for 
outrageous over-reaching by seeking such substantial attorney's fees for 
their efforts in submitting a response that was filed on May 6, 1983, 
eight (8) days after it was due under said Rule 2.8. 
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The only reason cited by the District Court for denying Appellants' 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT was that it was not filed within the time 
required by Rule 60 (b) and yet the Court accepted Respondent's MOTION IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING, AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
REHEARING ON THIRD-PAR1Y DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL, AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA MOORE, and AFFIDAVIT OF JAN CHASE 
eight (8) days after they were required by Rule 2.8. Fairness and equity 
demand that Respondents be held to the same technical compliance with 
the Rules of Procedure and Practice that are required of Appellant. In 
fact, Appellants should in fairness and equity be excused from the re-
quirement of Rule 60(b) to file thier MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT within 
three months of the date it was entered by the Court for the simple rea-
son that they had no actua 1 kn owl edge that there was a judgment against 
them until December 13, 1982, after the three months from the date of 
signing by the Court had passed. 
Appellants did in fact make their motion within nine (9) days of 
receiving actual notice; whereas, the Respondents failed to respond to 
Appellants' MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT within the ten ( 10) 
days required under Rule 2.8 even though Appellants' Motion was personal-
ly delivered to the office of Respondents' Counsel (R. 150 and 180). 
Respondents' MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING together with 
its accompanying affidavits should have, therefore, been striken and 
denied as untimely. Had the Court striken and denied Respondents' Motion, 
Appell ants' Motion would have stood unopposed (just as Respondents were 
unopposed at the June 7, 1982 Tri al) and would have necessarily been 
granted (just as Judgment was granted to Respondents' on June 7, 1982). 
12 
Appellants also note that at the November 21, 1977 hearing for a 
Default Judgment against Respondent Maurice Richards, the District Court 
granted said Respondent two (2) additional days in which to submit his 
responsive pleadings. (R. 16, 302, lines 7 and 8, and 307, lines 20-23) 
At that time his answer was already eleven (11) days late. Respondents 
then took eight (8) more days to file their responsive pleadings (R. 18-
26), but the Di strict Court still accepted them even though they were 
filed six (6) days beyond the two (2) day extension. 
The great latitude the District Court gave Respondents to file their 
Answer and responsive pleadings nineteen (19) days late; to file their 
FINDINGS OF FACT IWD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IWD JUDGMENT approximately two 
(2) months after the June 7, 1982 hearing (when they should have been 
submitted within fifteen (15) days) without first submitting them to 
opposing counsel; and to file their MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
REHEARING eight (8) days late, all without any explanation from Respon-
dents for the late filings, stands in sharp contrast to the rigid appli-
cation of the time limit under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which the District Court applied against Appellants in spite 
of Appellants' explanations for filing their MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
at the time they did and the Court's finding that the facts as stated in 
Appellants' affidavit could possibly be construed as excusable 
neglect ... " (R. 139). 
PO INT I I I 
RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT BY A RECEPT!tlJIST AT THE OFFICE BUILDING 
WHERE APPELLANTS' ATTO~EY HAD AN OFFICE SHOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO APPEL-
LIWTS' COUNSEL AND CERTAINLY NOT TO APPELLANTS WHO IN FACT NEVER RECEIVED 
N 0 TICE OF THE J UDGME N T. 
While Appellants acknowledge that notice to Appellants' counsel is 
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imputed to Appellants, Appellants submit that notice received by someone 
other than Appellants' counsel, such as a receptionist or secretary who 
does not then give that notice to the Attorney, should not be imputed to 
the Attorney's client, especially where the receptionist who signed for 
the document was not an agent of the Attorney and was not authorized to 
receive such documents for the Attorney. Central Trust Co. v. West India 
Improv. ~. 48 App. Div. 147, 63 N. Y. Supp. 853 ( 1900), reversed without 
reference to this point in 169 N.Y. 314, 62 N.E. 387 (1901); Brown v. 
Sweet, 7 Ont. App. Rep. 725 (1880); Re Ashton, 64 L. T. N. S. (Eng.} 
28, 39 Week. Rep. 320, 8 Morrell 72 (1891). 
In this case, the Court imputed the delivery of a copy of the Judgment 
to Appellants' former Counsel even though the person who received it was 
merely a receptionist in the office building where Appellants' former 
Counsel rented an office, had no authority to receive mail for Appel-
lants' former Counsel, and did not deliver the Judgment to Appellants' 
former Counsel personally. ( R. 243) 
POINT IV 
APPELLJllHS HAVE A MERITORIOUS CASE WHICH SHOULD BE TRIED ON THE MERITS. 
The Plaintiff/ Appellant commenced this case against Defendants/ 
Respondents Maurice Richards and Myrtle Bisel on the grounds that Defen-
dant Richards had signed an OFFER TO PURCHASE Jll-JD EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
(R. 6) and an AMENDMENT TO EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT (R. 7) to purchase Unit 
86 in building E-8 of the Three Fountains of North Ogden condominium com-
plex from Plaintiff, but thereafter defaulted on said agreement. (R. 2) 
Defendant Myrtle Bisel, who subsequently married Defendant Maurice Rich-
ards ( R. 353), signed a HOME OWNER'S ACCEPTANCE ( R. 8-9) and thereafter 
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occupied the subject property. (R. 2) Both Defendants were given 
proper notice to vacate the premises and pay a fair and reasonable amount 
of rent during the tenn of occupancy but refused to do so. (R. 2) 
Without any contract with Plaintiff for either services or materials 
Defendant Myrtle Bisel filed a NOTICE OF LIEN against the subject pro-
perty. ( R. 4 and 12) 
Defendants filed a late JlN S<IER and COL.NTERCLAIM. The Law Partner-
ship in which Defendant Maurice Richards is a Partner joined with said 
Defendant in filing a THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT. (R. 18-37) The JlNS<IER, 
COIJHERCLAIM mo THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT can be summarized as alleging that 
Plaintiff contracted to sell the Three fountains of North Ogden condomin-
ium complex to Northern Development Company on May 3, 1976 (R. 70, Defen-
dant's Exhibit 4); that Defendant Maurice Richards entered into a Unifonn 
Real Estate Contract respecting the above mentioned Unit 86 with Northern 
Development Company on May 8, 1976 which provided for Defendant Richards 
to utilize the services of Defendant Myrtle (Susie) Bisel (R. 23 and 28, 
, 3) to complete and decorate the Unit at buyers expense but with the 
cost to be deducted from the selling price. Defendant Richards and his 
Law Partnership also claimed credit for legal services rendered to the 
Plaintiff, Northern Development Company, and Three Fountains of North 
Ogden, Inc. (R. 23-26 and 28) 
If the Judgment against Appellants is set aside and Appellants are 
thus given the opportunity to go to trial on the merits, Appellants will 
show that Appellant Wayne Garff told Defendant Maurice Richards that he 
(Garff) desired to sell the Three Fountains of North Ogden condominium 
complex and would pay for his services in helping to locate qualified 
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buyers, ect. {R. 153-154) Mr. Richards never did find qualified buyers. 
None of the parties he recommended proved to be financially qualified. 
{R. 154) Although he did spend considerable time negotiating and drafting 
various agreements and other legal documents for which he now seeks to 
collect legal fees from Appellants Wayne Garff and Wayne Garff Construc-
tion Company, Inc., said Appellants never received any billing statements 
from Defendant Maurice Richards or Third Party Plaintiff, Richards, Caine 
and Richards. (R. 155) Appellants were unaware of any such claims for 
legal services until they received Respondent's ANSo/ER, COLNTERCLAIM /lND 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT. It should be noted that the billing statement 
dated January 13, 1977 was allegedly received by Gary Walker on January 
13, 1977. {R. 70, Defendant's Exhibit 10) The statement is "FOR PERIOD: 
May through November 1979". Thus it appears this document was specially 
contrived as an exhibit for trial. Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2 also 
appear to have been contrived. Although Defendant's Exhibit 1 is pur-
portedly a time sheet for hours worked from January 5, 1976 through 
April 17, 1976, it appears that all the entries were made in the same 
handwriting in the same ink thus raising a suspicion that the entries 
were all made at the same time. The same can be said for the entries 
from May 4, 1976 to November 5, 1976 on Defendant's Exhibit 2. 
It is noted that Defendant Maurice Richards was attorney for Gary 
Walker and Gus Janis prior to becoming attorney for Appellants. (R. 322) 
Thus Defendant Richards had a serious conflict of interest in trying to 
represent all parties but he has presented no document or agreement of 
any kind whereby Appellants were put on notice of his conflict of inter-
est or where they agreed to Richards or his Law Firm continuing to repre-
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sent them under such circumstances. REVISED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
OF lliE UTAH STATE BAR, DISCIPLINARY RULES, DR 5-105. 
Defendant Richards had signed an OFFER TO PURCHASE AND EARNEST 
MONEY AGREEMENT ( R. 6) with Wayne Garff Construction, Inc. on December 
31, 1975, which provided for Richards to pay $34,900 for Unit 86. On May 
3, 1976, Wayne Garff Construction, Inc. sold the entire condominium com-
plex to Northern Development Company under a Real Estate Contract ( R. 
70, Defendant's Exhibit 4) drafted by Defendant Maurice Richards {R. 
322-323). Five days later, on May 8, 1976, Defendant Maurice Richards 
completed the purchase of Unit 86 by a Uni fonn Real Estate Contract ( R. 
10-11) with Northern Development Company on substantially more favorable 
terms than provided in the December 31, 1975 OFFER TO PURCHASE AND EARNEST 
MONEY AGREEMENT. The purchase price is reduced to $34,000.00 and buyer 
is given the opportunity to complete the Unit at his expense and deduct 
his costs from the purchase price. (R. 10, 11 3) At the time Northern 
Development Company purchased the condominium complex from Wayne Garff 
Construction, Inc. and completed the sale of Unit 86 to Defendant Maurice 
Richards on such favorable terms, its President, Gary Walker knew it did 
not have the capacity to fulfill its contractual obligations to Wayne Garff 
Construction, Inc. (R. 204) 
Defendant Maurice Richards knew Appellants were seeking $100,000.00 
for their equity in the Three Fountains of North Ogden condominium complex 
(R. 335) but the parties (his clients, Gary Walker and Gus Janis) that he 
recommended to Appellants breached their contract with Appellants and ran 
up debts against the project which Appellants had to satisfy after they 
regained possession of the project with the assistance of other counsel. 
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(R. 154-155) 
The Hold Hannless Agreement oetween Appellants and Northern Develop-
ment C001pany (R. 70, Defendant's Exhioit 13) provides in part that: 
Gary Walker ... [and] ... Northern Development ... hereoy agree 
that they will not settle, compromise, stipulate to or negotiate 
any liaoility or cause of action they wish protection or indemnifi-
cation fr001 oy virtue of this Agreement unless Wayne Garff and 
Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc. have oeen notified of such 
liaoility or cause of action and have given written authority for 
involvement with the settlement or compr001i se of such l i aoil i ty or 
cause of action. 
It is mutually understood and agreed that such notification to 
Wayne Garff and Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc. shall oe 
given oy sending such to Stanley S. Adams, Attorney at Law, at Arrow 
Press Square, Glass Factory, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
It is noted that the AASolER-TO THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT (R. 41) filed 
oy Gary Walker in oehalf of Northern Development Co. and Three Fountains 
of North Ogden states in part: 
We deny all allegations. We do not owe Mr. Richards any money. 
We no longer have anything to do with Northern Development or Three 
Fountains. We sold the Three Fountains oack to Wayne Garff and have 
~Held (sic) Hannless Agreement with him. (Emphasis added) 
There is no Certificate of Service or Mailing or Return with said 
Answer showing the same to have oeen served on Wayne Garff or Wayne 
Garff Construction C001pany, Inc. or their then Attorney, Stanley S. Adams. 
Wayne Garff never knew such an answer had oeen filed oy Mr. Walker until 
he saw it in the Court file on May 18, 1983. Thus Appe 11 ants never 
received notice that Northern Development Company claimed protection 
under the Hold Hannless Agreement and therefore should not oe held 
liaole oy reason of said agreement. 
It is noted that although Gary Walker denied all allegations and 
denied owing Defendant Richards any money in his answer, he appeared at 
trial and testified that Northern Development Company did owe legal fees 
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to Mr. Richards and his finn. (R. 345-346) He had no written authority 
from Appellants to either file an answer or appear in Court for Northern 
Development Company. Indeed, inasmuch as he is not an attorney, he had 
no legal authority or right to represent any Corporation in Court. 
If Gary Walker wished protection under the Hold Harmless Agreement 
he was required by its terms to notify Wayne Garff and Wayne Garff Con-
struction Company, Inc. This he failed to do and thus he can claim no 
protection under the tenns of said agreement. The Respondents are not 
parties to the Hold Harmless Agreement and therefore can claim no rights 
by reason of said agreement. Although Gary Walker and Defendant Maurice 
Richards repeatedly claim throughout the record that Three Fountains of 
North Ogden, Inc. is a party to the Hold Hannless Agreement, said document 
speaks for itself. Three Fountains of North Ogden, Inc. is nowhere 
mentioned therein. (R. 24 11 8, 41, 334, 70 Defendant's Exhibit 13) 
Therefore, no valid claim can be made by Respondents against Appellants 
under the Hold Harmless Agreement for legal services rendered to Three 
Fountains of North Ogden, Inc. Nevertheless, the District Court awarded 
Respondents Judgment against Appellants for services rendered to Three 
Fountains of North Ogden Inc. because of said Hold Harmless Agreement. 
(R. 7311 7, 8, 10, 11) 
It is further noted that both Northern Development Company and Three 
Fountains of North Ogden, Inc. were involuntarily dissolved by the Lt. 
Gov./ Sec. of State of the State of Utah on December 29, 1978. ( R. 157-
158) It is also noted that in his Answer, Gary Walker stated he no 
longer had " ... anything to do with ~orthern Development or Three Foun-
tains." (R. 41) Under such circumstances, it is difficult to understand 
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Gary Walker's interest in being in Court in this matter on June 7, 1982, 
some 3 1/2 years after the Corporations had been dissolved and 4 1/2 
years after fi 1 i ng his Answer stating he had nothing to do with the 
Corporations other than to assist his attorney, Defendant Maurice Rich-
ards to obtain a judgment against Appellants for services actually ren-
dered to Wa 1 ker. 
It is also noted that Respondent's Counterclaim only asked for 
$7 ,409.78 for Myrtle Bisel (R. 24 f 1) but the District Court erroneously 
awarded her Judgment for $18,771.78 (R. 76), or $11,362 more than she 
asked for in the complaint even after her attorney conceded that she 
received $2,638.00 which was to be deducted from the total judgment. (R. 
358, line 17-19) 
POINT V 
SUBSTANTIAL, IRREPARABLE DAMAGE WILL BE DONE TO APPELLANTS IF 1HE JUDG-
MENT IS AL LOWED TO ST.AND, WHILE SETTING A SIDE 1H E JUDGMENT WOULD ME RELY 
RESTORE 1HE PREVIOUSLY EXISTING STATUS, PERMITTING PROPER PROCEEDINGS 
ON 1HE ME RI TS. 
The court should note that this case was tried nearly 5 years after 
it was filed. The delays in bringing this case to trial were largely 
caused by the Repondents who requested five continuances of trial set-
tings. The case then went to trial when Appellants were not present 
solely because they had been assured that the case was settled and would 
be dismissed. Judgment of $36,931.78 has been taken against Appellants. 
If the court al lows this Judgment to stand, Appellants only recourse 
would be against their former counsel on the grounds that he assured 
them that the case was settled and failed to properly represent them. 
However, such a claim against Appellants' former counsel would be a 
grave injustice to him in light of the District Court's statement in its 
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MEMORPNDUM DECISION that: 
Under the facts as stated by plaintiffs affidavit, it could 
possibly be construed there was excusable neglect for not appearing 
at the time the trial was set. (R. 139) 
On the other hand, what damage will be done to Respondents if this 
Judgment is set aside? They will simply be returned to the same position 
they were in prior to trial on June 7, 1982. They are still in a posi-
ti on to assert every claim they asserted on June 7, 1982. 
The general rule is that when an order or judgment is vacated 
the previously existing status is restored and the situation is the 
same as though the order or judgment had never been made. The 
matters in controversy are left open for future detennination. The 
action is not thereby discontinued or abated, but is subject to 
further proceedings in regular course. The party in whose favor a 
judgment has been entered irregularly may, after it has been vacated, 
proceed as if it had never been rendered, and in due time and upon 
proper proceedings obtain a val id judgment. 1 Freeman On Judgments 
(5th Ed.) §302, pp. 594-595; also see Wrang v. Spencer, 4 Conn. Cir. 
473, 235 A.2d 861 (1967); 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, §126, p. 
641. 
In Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, Utah, 611 P. 2d 369 
(1980), this Court, after noting that this was a perplexing case in that 
the plaintiff and its counsel had "proceeded without any impropriety, 
including appearing on the trial date and presenting their case" stated: 
The unifonnally acknowledged policy of the law is to accord 
litigants the opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that 
can be done without serious injustice to the other party. [Locke 
v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955)] To that encl,tlie 
courts are generally indulgent toward the setting aside of default 
judgments where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for 
the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely application is 
made to set it aside. [See Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962).] Consistent with the objective 
just stated, where there is doubt about whether a default should be 
set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the 
end that each party may have an opportunity to present his side of 
the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with 
law and Justice. [See Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897 
( 1907); Locke v. Peterson, supra.] 
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Application of the principles discussed herein to the instant 
situation leads to the conclusion that the interests of justice 
will best be served by setting aside the default judgment and giving 
the parties that opportunity. In that connection, we call attention 
to the prefatory clause of Rule 60(b) that "upon such terms as are 
just" a party may be relieved from a judgment. This authorizes the 
trial court to impose such terms as may be just as a condition to 
setting aside the default. 
In its MEMORANDUM DECISION, the District Court noted the" ... plain-
tiff had some cause for excusable neglect to set aside the judgment .. 
(R. 139) Therefore, consistent with the policy stated by this Court in 
the above case, this Court should resolve any doubt in favor of reversing 
the decision of setting aside the judgment in this case. As was noted by 
this Court, the Court has authority to impose such terms as may be just 
as a condition to setting aside the default. Appellants acknowledge that 
their former counsel was guilty of a degree of negligence in handling 
Appellants' case and therefore the Court may choose to impose appropriate 
sanctions on Appellants' former counsel. However, surely the Court will 
agree that allowing a Judgment of $36,931.78 to stand against Appellants 
leaving them no recourse except against their former counsel is a grossly 
disproportionate penalty for the negligence of their former counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Where Counsel for Respondents has entirely ignored the requirements 
of Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah by failing to serve the proposed Findings 
and Judgment on Appellants' counsel before filing with the court for 
signature and took over two months rather than the required 15 days to 
file the Findings and Judgment with the court, substantial grounds exist 
on which to set aside the Judgement. Where Counsel has thus ignored the 
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requirements of Rule 2.9, this court should hold that the three months 
requirement of Rule 60(b) does not begin to run until the Findings and 
Judgment have been served on opposing counsel. 
Inasmuch as the Respondent's MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
REHEARING together with its supporting affidavits was filed untimely 
under Rule 2.8 of the RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT 
COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH, this Court should hold that it was improper 
to deny Appellants' MOTION FOR REHEARING ON THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT solely on the ground that Appellants' 
initial MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT was filed untimely. Litigants 
should be treated equally in such matters. 
This Court should find that Sylvia Martinez was not an authorized 
agent of Counsel for Appellants and did not have authority to accept 
service for said Counsel. But even if this Court does find Sylvia Mar-
tinez was Mr. Adams authorized agent, she did not receive service until 
September 23, 1982. Mr. Adams filed his Motion to Set Aside by mail on 
December 21, 1982, a date within the three month requirement of Rule 60 
( b). 
The Appellants have a meritorious case on the merits and should be 
given the opportunity for a full hearing on the merits. 
Consistent with the purpose of Rule 60(b) and the uniformally 
acknowledged policy of the law as stated by this Court in Interstate 
Excavating v. Agla Development, supra, this Court should resolve any 
doubt in favor of setting aside the judgment on such terms as are just 
and allowing Appellants the opportunity to have their side of the case 
heard on the merits. Allowing this ,Judgment to stand under all the 
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facts of this case would perpetrate an egregious miscarraige of justice. 
Appellants plea for Rhadamanthine justice: Defendant Maurice Rich-
ards should be disciplined for the conflicts of interest and self-dealing 
evident throughout the record of this case, rather than oeing allowed to 
maintain the $36,931.78 judgment that was awarded to him, his wife and 
his law fi nn. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of Septemoer, 1983. 
Lorin R. Bl auer 
Attorney for Appellants 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing APPEL LAN TS' 
BRIEF to the attorney for Respondents, Gary Gale, Suite 205, Legal Arts 
Building, 2568 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401 this 20th day of 
September, 1983. 
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